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>> if you do, you're in the top 1%. >> there's a violation of the rules. >> i'm not going to ask. i'm not going to ask, but if everyone here in this audience was dead on in the middle of the middle class, then the tax cuts for every single one of you all added up would be less than the just one member of that top

wealthiest 1%. now you judge for yourself whether or not that's fair. >> we are moving on. 50 million americans -- secondly, we've had enough. it's time to unit. you talk about eight years, and in eight years, they have not got anything done on medicare. time to get something done. >> presidential town hall debates began, and bill clinton and ross perot and every election sense, hopefuls took part in the up decided voters, and c-span's live coverage starts at 7 eastern.xd

the aclu racial justice project and authors stewart taylor discuss the university of texas case and the role of affirmative action in today's society. from "washington journal," this is 40 minutes. >> host: for the next 45 minutes, a discussion about the supreme court and talk on affirmative action. joining us, the author of "mismatch," and welcome. >> nice to be with you. >> host: joining us from new york, the aclu racial justice program serving on the senior staff, welcome. >> thankou. >> host: the supreme court heard a case this week dealing with affirmative action so tell

us what happened. >> guest: sure. the case pending before the court was brought by a young lady named abigail fisher, and she said based on race, she was violated, and basically our position in that of many other organizations and individuals was that the university of texas has a fair process in place that expands opportunity for all people and should be allowed to have additional factors in addition to scores to create a learning environment to benefit all students preparing them for a global environment they will enter when they leave school. we made technical arguments about the standard of review that was at issue, but the crux of it was we wanted the university's process was legal, to be upheld. >> host: can you briefly

explap how the university of texas, the old revisions of race, as far as process is concerned? >> guest: sure. you know, they looked at two issues. first, they look at the academic performance of the students, and let me start by saying they have a unique procedure down there in that there's a state law in texas that was enacted in 1998 that provided for the top 10% of every graduating senior to be automatically admitted into a university of texas program including the university of texas in austin. the university of texas at austin admissions were capped a couple years ago at 80%, and so that's when they got higher texas classes, proposed to people in the top 10% of the graduating class. after that, the remaining 20%

looked at academic index and a number of other factors like perm achievement index, and in that index, beginning in 2004, they looked at 12 factors including social economic status with the family, whether english is the language spoken in the home, whether the student comes from a single parent home, whether the student displayed leadership, performance on two essays -- >> host: okay, uh-huh. >> guest: and race. race is one of the issues, but can be considered if the student's identified their race in the applications. >> host: mr. taylor joining us here in washington, also filed brief in the case. talk about the argument of the brief and the argument overall for the university of texas and if you think something's wrong. >> guest: right. courteney's summary was good in details, but we're on the other side of the case. we co-authored this, we argue

that, in fact, not only are people like abigail's rights affected, a large racial preference, but we think that they are bad for beneficiaries in many cases. that's the title of "mismatch," the title of our book. basically, when you take a student whose act scores are not 50 points below, but 300 points below the classmates, it's not good for the student because they will be put in a fast environment where the rest of the class moves faster, the teaches go faster and deeper than that student's ready for. good students, but some might do better at state texas a&m and find themselves struggling academically and falling behind, bad grades, sometimes trouble

graduating. it's not good for the intellectual self-confidence, and it happens without warning. nobody tells me affirmative action students that you're not well to do here well academically. >> host: as far as the process is concerned, the justices heard that the cases meet. ultimately, what happens on what they decide? what happens on the university side? >> guest: well, whey heard the case, and what i talked bow was not much of the argument. the argument was about fairness, ect., and a lot of details. they were promptly decided in june based on the arguments. i guess they strike down the affirmative action 5-4. that's what most people expected going on and the argument confirmed the expectation. the big question is how broad it is. whether it was a narrow opinion, limited to the facts and the university of texas, doesn't have an effect on everybody else

after they changed it around, or rather there's a broader opinion in major reforms in the way it works nationwide. i hope they do the latter. toy not think they're going to ban the race, an i adopt think they should. >> host: guests talking about the court case dealing with affirmative action at the university. if you want to ask them a question, call 202-585-3881. those republicans, call 202-555, 3 #880. also you can seemed us tweets. depending op how the justices come down on this and how they write their opinion, what does that ultimately mean for affirmative action programs at universities? >> guest: well, i think i partially agree with our guest in that i think the argument did cannot look great for the

university of texas, and she was solicitor general, and i think it's going to be 5-3 if kennedy goes with the conservative. if the court does strike down the use of race, i'm hoping it will be limited too the university of texas because the issue there is they have a race neutral program in the top 10%, and they're achieving some diversity with that, and the additional consideration of race should be permitted. it permits the university to get diversity within diversity, and i think that's very important. i think through the top 10% plan, the university did a very thorough study after having had it for five years before implementing race as one of the factors they looked a deciding

it was necessary and important to get the classrooms filled the way they wanted them filled. the university has that right, but, you know, if the court strikes it down, i hope it's limited to the program in texas, and it doesn't force every university around the country to have to try to implement some race neutral way because when you use a race neutral way, like the top 10% plan to achieve diversity in a university setting, what you're doing is essentially promoting the fact that high schools around this country are segregated racially, and, you know, that's because of the patterns in secondary education, and being segregated still, and we already had that issue decided in brown versus board of education. i don't think we're really getting at the core issue of assuring there's a quality of opportunity for stay tuneds in

this country of all backgrounds if the case is decided in such a way. >> host: mr. taylor, before we go to calls, the ripple effect then, if it's written in such a way just to the university of texas, would be natural cop collusion other universities are forced to re-examine their positions because of this? >> guest: i stand corrected, so it would be 5-4, but if they strike it down broadly, universities all over the country have to recast their programs, i believe, if they strike it down narrowly, it has a limited effect. just like to mention two things about the perm achievement index. they are interesting. one, in texas, the university and achievement can be born, black, his pappic, or american indian. it is not an achievement to be born white or asian. that receivers -- shows oh deep the race consciousness seeped in the system.

there's a tie breaker on the scales, and the main difference in sat scores between black and asians is more than 450 points sat points out of 2400. that's the difference. >> host: fairfax, virginia, democrats' line, john, hello. >> caller: race sighful up to a level of white students through a reparation plan that would show up at school and to do well in school. i think if you did this for two or three generations, you

wouldn't need affirmative action, and i'd like to have people think about doing that. thank you. >> host: the proposal that he brings? >> guest: it's a well meaning proposal, and i'm not sure how it would play out, but as the brief in the book argues when you take a student who is not well prepared because of a bad high school education in many cases to compete academically with his or her classmates, it's not good for that student. the black or hispanic student put into a competitive environment, say you're a good ballplayer, but you're thrown in the nfl, it helps when you take people -- admit them into colleges where they are likely to do well. >> host: there's that argument, mr. taylor's argument in college with those who do well. >> guest: i don't necessarily agree that university of texas and every university are

choosing up qualified applicants or that race is the factor that makes people go to college and do poorly. for instance, mr. taylor talked about the gaps between sat scores for asian and black students and from the university of texas. we don't know, you know, what's bringing down the scores. i think it's unfortunate there is such a large gap, but maybe the students being admitted with super low sat scores who are african-american were admitted because they are athletes or because they have leadership potential or for some other reason other than race. one of the interesting things to me is that universities should be permitted to, you know, admit qualifieded applicants. mr. taylor, you know, asked for more transparency from the universities regarding the way race is used, and i think that's very interesting point because we don't really know exactly how

race is used. what we do know from talking is that did can't be the deciding factors. there a case in the 70s that made that clear. this can't be quotas, and so race can only be one part of a holistic review of the apply -- applicants' package. it should be considered, and i think it is considered, and these gaps are disturbing, but hopefully we can address them through better quality education by students who are entering college. >> host: michael, florida, independents' line. good morning. >> caller: good morning. i was wondering whrrpt -- whether or not he considers the fact poverty and education go hand-in-hand, okay? it goes hand in hand. there's a group of people out there who are not educated by the universities of the world. there's an underclass of people.

african-americans and other minorities have not. allowed, and there needs to be evening up. >> guest: well, i think what's interesting is the idea that affirmative action and racial performance in admissions help with poverty is the widely held misconception, and it's understandable, that's what you read in the newspapers, but as a matter of empirical fact among experts that, in fact, most recipients of racial preferences are black and hispanic students who go to the university of texas and other universities because they got accepted on a preference of being jumped over, less -- more than whites and asians who have better academic qualifications. this is actually, as a operates today, it started in the poverty program, but as it operates today, it's making inequality in

america worse, not better. >> host: and we -- there's a quote in one of the write ups in the paper today saying analysts say diversity can be considered without achieving race in admissions. they said a university in some states found success with policies that give poor students preference, but you have to provide them with more financial aid. what do you think? >> guest: i don't think they are exclusive. i think poverty is already considered by the university of texas, but not at the expense of also considering race because any quality has many ways in the country. when it comes in terms of gender, race, in terms of class, in terms of a number of different issues, and the university should be permitted to consider all of those things in order to ensure that students are prepared for an increasingly global world, and the world is not just separated by class.

unfortunately, despite the strides we've made, we still have a ways to go. we live in a society that's still quite segregated by race, and universities should be allowed to look at those issues in order to ensure we're keeping pathways of opportunity open for all students. >> host: a call from shawn, hanover, massachusetts, good morning. >> caller: i couldn't agree less than -- sorry, the lady from aclu is totally wrong. i would like to hope that discrimination would be abolished. affirmative action -- sorry, i'm nervous -- affirmative action, discrimination, and i would hope instead there's a law to pass

for the colleges did not ask your race, but hope that in the future we come together rather than ripping each other apart by race. education through college is a right. you have to pay to get to college. if you take the highest scores first, not because you're black, not because you're white, chinese, mexican, whatever, they can't fill high-tech jobs today because people get in college that don't deserve to be there. >> host: go ahead. >> guest: well, i mean, you know, i don't think it's discrimination against whites who consider race in university admissions because, again, universities are looking among a pool of qualified applicants so there's a number of things to consider. it's going to disproportionally

benefit whites. whether you have leadership potential, extracurricular activities, whether you did something interesting, you know, went to africa and dug ditches, i mean, those things are considered in essays, and they can benefit students who are not poor orla -- or latino or black. there were black and latino students who are higher academic grades and not admitted in the same class in which she was denied admissions. i think the tough thing is that there's a larger pool of students who are qualified for admissions than can be offered admissions to every university so invariably, people are upset when they are not admitted, but it's not because race is considered # among the 12 things that are considered. >> host: mr. taylor?

>> guest: i noticed earlier, towards a possible area of consensus, it's a sensitive topic for a long time, but if you seen some of the transparency idea we argued for in the brief and the book, we don't argue affirmative action, but a major remedy is make public how the system works. it's now very secret, very secret. no university voluntarily makes public how much weight it gives to race nor how well the people who are admitted with lower scores how well they do. if i was coming in from high school now, i'd want to know that sort of information before i decided what college to go to. is this college going to take me in as a pumpkin and put me in at the bottom of the class? transparency would be a powerful way to include everything about the situation, i think, and if

people like ms. bowie go along with transparency, i think a lot of disagreements we have would eventually fade away. >> host: what would you say? >> guest: i would say -- what i would say is that we don't necessarily know how race is used. i'm not sure that i think universities should be required to discuss every aspect of their admissions process because, again, i think, you know, i think it varies from university to university, and they should be agenting within the law in that as i mentioned race is not a deciding factor. it should be one factor among the holistic review, but what i would say where we agree is that neither of us want students of color harmed, and i happen to disagree that i don't think admitted into a university, i was admitted to the university of texas school of law in 1997,

and -- sorry, 1996, and, you know, it didn't harm me at all. i don't know whether race was a fog tore. i don't think it was. i never thought their thinking, oh, i'm here, and i should be at the bottom of the class or anything like that. it was in a interesting time at that school, but i worked very hard and did quite well so, you know, do i think university of texas should be forced to put on display exactly how they make the saw camming? no, i don't, but i don't think they should be harmed, but improve opportunities at the elementary and secondary levels so that that gap that was referredded to at first is made smaller. >> host: how did she determine she had a case? >> guest: well, it's interesting. back to transpaper sigh. she looked around, he didn't get in. she had a family tradition of going there. she didn't get in.

she saw students of color who got in who had less grades and lower test scores than she did. she decided maybe she was a victim of racial discrimination, and certainly a victim of having race held against her in the admissions process. whether she would have gotten in without is really -- nobody knows because that's part of the secrecy of the process, and that's one reason that lawsuits are rare. she had to take a step there that this lawsuit would eventually get her somewhere, and now it's got her to the doorsteps of the u.s. supreme court. one thing i'd like to agree with ms. bowie on is where the rubber meets the road is k-12 # education. the reason we have a bold argument is the big gap in the academic qualifications and various racial groups coming out of high school and first grade for that matter, and that's where we should be pouring our energy and our resources, and i want to be clear, i am by no

means saying that what students of color should not be at the best universities, but if they are admitted under similar standards or even slightly different standards from the other students, they are not harmed. it's great. the problem is not whether you're a student of color. it could happen to an athlete. if you were taken into a university, it's very much less prepared academically than your classmates, it's likely to harm you. if you are well qualified, you'll do fine. >> host: next call from sandy, cleveland, ohio, democrats' line. go ahead. >> caller: [inaudible] you don't have statistics to prove that students that are admitted are in the program fail. another thing i'd like to

comment on. that other program, that legacy, what's it for? will you go to college because the one that favored usually well to do or rich white people -- there was a george bush to get us to stanford. >> host: leaving it there. >> guest: good question. although it's very secretive on a college level, there are broad statistics that are public for various reasons to draw cop collusions about how -- conclusions about how it works, and a lot of scholars spent time analyzing those statistics, and that's how we know the average sat gaps between black and whites are 200-400 points which are large. we know that about half the black students finish, and we

know that half of the students finish in the bottom 10% of the class. we know that they are four times the race, and there are a lot of indications, and we know blacks drop out of science classes wanting to be scientists drop out so we know that. as for legacy, i'm not -- and i think the caller an i agree on this, but i don't think legacy 1 a very good thing. as she says, primitive people benefit from that. there is a difference, though. the best statistic shows the legty preferences the people get, the alumni kids, it's small, maybe an average jump of 30-40 sat points. that's a lot different than a 400 point jump, and that's why there's not really a problem of legacy having a hard time making it in the colleges they go to.

>> host: a lot of statistics. where did you get that information from? >> guest: a lot of studies, but what i mentioned in particular come from a book by thomas and walton who are pro-racial preference, wrote a deep scholarly book called "no longer separate but not yet equal" in 2009. >> host: do you have thoughts on this? >> guest: yeah, sure. you know, the completion that mr. taylor reaches in saying that these gaps are due to affirmative action is where i think there's -- where we disagree. there is some studies that dispute the conclusion that was reached, and specially, there's no evidence that there's a positive link between affirmative action and these items. for instance, if african-american students are

admitted to law school and subs -- subsequently fail the bar, we don't know why. we don't know if they were admitted into a law school that's theoretically too difficult for them or an elite law school which is the theory offered by mr. taylor or for whatever reason. maybe they are not good at test taking, never were, or something was going on in their lives, or, you know, stereotype threat, or other issues that come up for people so i guess the issue is there's a number of checks university people look at when they enroll. we don't know what role race plays so it's hard to say there's a connection between race and failure of the african-american students. the statistics are disturbing, and, again, where i agree is i'd like to see students of color

and all students perform well so if it's put in place to ensure they do, you know, i'd like to see that where i don't agree with mr. taylor is that i don't think the students should be secluded from going to schools they are admitted too, -- to, and, you know, students themselves are in the best position and universities are in the best position to determine whether or not they should be in the school. >> host: a call on the independent line, alexander, good morning. >> caller: yes, sir. my question is when i look at mr. taylor, you went to princeton university in a time where african-americans did not constitute two and a quarter percent of the population. you went to harvard in the time where african-americans didn't make up 6%. you practiced law and a majority of white law firms didn't have 2% of the ship of african-american.

his entire career is spent in the majority white communities. mismatch theory is the opinion that african-americans do not belong at top tiered universities. my first question is do you think that your policy is your theory saying that african-americans are inferior to top universities, and the second part of the question which asks how did the diversity background become precedent because in back that four other supreme court justices who said that affirmative action to remedy the discrimination, the other court justices disagreed, and essentially they had the diversity so for the last 30-40 years, we have been have one

justice remark as precedent. i want that topic discussed as well. >> host: mr. taylor, you can go first. >> guest: a lot of questions there. i won't answer all of them. i'm not saying african-americans do not belong in the universities, but all i'm saying is that it would be better if they were admitted according to the same standards as other students. what i am saying is that discriminating against white and asian students who are far academically are not doing anything when the african-americans are not well qualified. the caller made a lot of my privileged background. i think that's having been born into a fairly privileged [background sounds]. that was not my fault. i could have been born into a poor family, but i was not. that doesn't disqualify me from analyzing stat records, and that does not disqualify me from having opinions on weather, for

example, on whether it's better for black students if they were informed. unlike my friend up there said black students ought to be able to make informed choices. i agree. right now, they are systematically misled into the establishment about what the chances are likely to be when they are not well qualified. i'll add one thing. my coafter huh thor, one of the -- my coauthor, one of the first jobs was a civil rights worker all his life. what brought him to the idea this is not helping black students was the deep familiarity with the facts. it was not the knee jerk opposition to helping black people. far from it. it was just the opposite. >> host: do you want to add anything? as far as precedence is concerned, l caller referred to the document, but you were also

mentioning justice o'cop -- o'connor who established # it, and suspect that the precedent of what we talk about today? >> guest: well, two things, the caller -- it was mentioned, and it was the part of a prarlty decision, and it was picked up by o'connor in the university of michigan case, and so it is what we're left with, and so we aren't -- we can't use the rationale which, frankly, makes more sense, of remedying past racial discrimination to justify race as a factor in admissions. prior to the case, it was one of the issues, and it was argued between the case that remme

passed racial discrimination could be a justification inned admissions, and that was clearly not the way we were going after they brought the opinion. the diversity rationale is, i think, somewhat murky. it says, you know, university has the right to have a diverse environment, and i think that does make sense, but i think it gives less clarity to universities and to the public and to us to what are they really trying to do when really affirmative action came about to ensure equal opportunity to people of color and women. it came about in the 60s when jfk prohitted discrimination in federal contracting, and lyndon banks johnson said federal contractors needed to take affirmative steps to ensure that, you know, equal opportunity was available for everyone so it's not something

that was initially about diversity. it was about ensuring that the path to racial justice was raised. >> host: just to give the viewers a sense of what happened in the court and give the guests a sense to respond to it. we'll play a little of some of the arguments that took place. this was an argument brought up twice today in the paper. this is justice scalia talking about how race is determined. here's a portion. i want you both to listen, then respond and give context to what was said. >> you have an applicant whose parents -- a partner in your law firm, another was a corporate lawyer. they have income that puts them in the top 1% from others in the country, and they have parents with graduate degrees. they deserve a leg up against an asian or white african whose parents are absolutely average

in terms of education and income? >> no, your honor. let me answer the question. the example comes word for word that this court approved and that justice powell -- >> how could the answer be no? >> because, your honor, our point is that we want minorities from different backgrounds. we go out of the way to recruit minorities from disadvantaged backgrounds. >> what you're saying what counts is race above all? >> no, your honor. >> that's the necessary response to justice anito's question. >> no, your honor. we want different experiences -- >> under privileged of a certain race, and privilege of a certain race. that's race. >> it's only a small part of the argument that took place, but what's the take away not only the arguments made, but the tone a little as well. >> guest: you know, i stand by what i said earlier in that it

didn't look good for the university of texas. i think the example is you have two candidates, both have parents are not top 1% of the earners. one is african-american and one is white or asian, and, you know, alito's question was, you know, do you give the african-americans a leg up, and garre tried to say no, and they basically didn't allow him to give the answer. i think that is the correct answer though. it's no. they look at the candidates holistically so that candidate is not necessarily getting race as a plus factor. race is considered as part of a hole liz -- holistic review, and they are looking for disadvantaged youth and people who come from different backgrounds, and one thing i'd like to say that kind of we referenced earlier indirectly in that mr. taylor said being born black or his

painic in texas is a perm achievement, but born white is an achievement as well. in texas, according to the plan, if you're white and you are in a predominantly minority high school, and you're a student leader there, the cross racial bonds clearly you had to make would be rewarded, and you would be given credit for that, and you would likely be admitted because of that whereas, you know, it's not like they don't admit white student body leaders who are the president of a predominantly white student class or black stay tuned -- student leadership in a predominantly minority class. it wouldn't be an advantage in that case that they wouldn't let him. >> host: mr. taylor. >> guest: i heard a different question than ms. bowie apparently heard. i heard what if the papers of

the black parents are rich and the white students are not? why does texas want to give a performance over a black student opposed to a better qualified white student who is less affluent? that's how it works in texas. that's what they say in their brief is that we want to do this so we'll have both privileged and under prief leminged black -- privileged black students in the stay tuned -- student body. he knows what every race advocate knows which is when you're asked a question to which there's no answer that doesn't sound terrible, you duck the question, change the subject, say no, and go off in a different direction. he did it very aptly, but he didn't fool justice kennedy. >> host: thanks for waiting, independent line, keith, hello. >> caller: yes, thank you, c-span. i have a question for ms. bowie

about affirmative action. my question would be do you believe affirmative action helps overt -- helps or hurts minority students? >> guest: do i believe is helps or hurts minority students? >> caller: yes. >> caller: i believe it opens a path way for all students. no more for minority students or white students. all students should be exposed to diversity. >> host: let's hear from keith. keith, do you have a follow-up? >> caller: yes, my follow-up, one min here, i want to ask a few questions. >> host: only time for one more. go ahead. >> caller: okay. so if it's an open path for minority students, what path is there to close for? >> guest: i'm not sure i understand the question, if if you say it opens pathways for

minority students, are you saying it closes pathways for some? i don't think that's necessarily the case unless it's a zero-sum game. i think it provides diversity which is good for all students. it prepares them for learning in a diverse environment and going on to work in an increasingly global environment. it's a good thing for all students. i don't think it closes any pathways. >> host: one more question of each of you and you can give final thoughts as well. does this -- no matter how it comes down in the court, does it affect only public universities or private universities could be involved or affected by it? >> guest: it could affect private universities in this sense. the constitution, which is the issue here, racial discrimination, applies only to public universities, but if the provision of the 1964 civil rights act, title 6, basically takes the same standards that the constitution brought to

public universities and applies it to private universities that accept federal money. all private universities almost accept federal money. it ends up pretty much in the same place. one thing i'd add is i heard ms. bowie says racial performance opens palletways for all students. i wish abby were here. she was a white student, discriminated against on grounds of her race when she was rejected by the university of texas, and i'd like to have her explain what pathways are not open for her. >> host: ms. bowie, want to follow-up on that? >> guest: first of all, i agree with mr. taylor on title six. i didn't think she was discriminated against on basis of the race for one simple reason. as i explained earlier, the university looked at the academic index and personal achievement index of which race is one of 12 factors.

in her academic index was too low the year she applied in 2008. they never reviewed her personal achievement index. there's no way she would have been admitted in that class so, you know, the fact that race was considered # for some portion of students didn't harm her, and i think, you know, i think the claim that she somehow is entitled to go to the university of texas, you know, because her parents went there and because race was one factor considered among many is not true. >> host: we're out of time for this, but we thank both guests for participating joining us from new york is ms. bowie from the alu racial justice project, and stuart taylor, author of "mismatch," thanks for the discussion. >> guest: thanks to you. >> guest: thank you.

>> it is about you, and i want to come back to something i said before. if you want somebody who believes that we were better off eight years ago than we are now, and that we ought to go back to the kind of policies we had back then emphasizing tax cuts mainly for the wealthy, here is your map. if you want somebody to fight for you and fight to have the middle class tax cuts, then i'm your man. i want to be. now, i doubt anybody here makes more than $33 # ,000 a year. i won't ask you, but if you do, you're in the top 1%. >> that would be a violation of the rules. >> i'm not going to ask, but if everyone here in this audience was dead on in the middle of the middle class, then the tax cuts for every single one of you all

added up would be less than the tax cut his plan would give to just one member of that top wealthier 1%. now, you judge for yourself whether or not that's fair. >> we're moving on. >> 50 million americans get no taxes. >> that's not right. >> he was not one of those. secondly, we had enough fights. it's time to unite. in eight years, they have not got anything done on medicare, social security, the bill of rights. >> all right. time to get something done. >> presidential town hall debates began in ?iew with then president george bush, governor bill clinton, and businessman ross perot, and every election since, hopefuls took questions from undecided voters in the same town hall style. tuesday night, watch president obama and mitt romney in their debates. c-span's live cocoverage starts at 7 eastern. tuesday, there was a session

on the fiscal cliff, spending cuts, and tax increases scheduled to take effect in january 2013. speakers include peter, republican congressman from illinois, and alson schwartz, a democrat from pennsylvania here op c-span2. later, the american enterprise institute hears from the education advisers for the obama and romney campaigns to discuss their candidate's policy plans live at 4:30 eastern here on c-span2. >> i watch c-span because when i want to get familiar without a lot of talking and pundits adding their point of view, i can get the original script from a person, and then i can come to my own cop collusion. c-span, c-span2, and c-span 2;

c-span2 is booktv which i love, and c-span2 is history, and sometimes i want to visit the senate and see what the house is doing. that's c-span too. >> she watches c-span on verizon, c-span, created by america's cable companies in 1979 brought to you as a public service by your television provider. >> october marks the 50th anniversary of the 13 day cuban missile crisis in on october 14th, 1962 a u-2 spy plane photographed missiles in cuba. historians, filmmakers, and others discuss how close the u.s. was to nuclear war and its historic relevance. from the presidential library in

boston, this is just under an hour. >> our panel will focus particularly on kennedy, crus chef, and castro, and we have ac impressive array of talent here, and i'm looking forward to the discussion. we t have jim, professor at geoe washington university, an authoi of a new book on vietnam, and also author of important articles on the missile crisis,n and author of one minute to midnight about the cuban missile crisis, and a brand new bookve a "six months in 1945", just out this week. next is author of a number of books like " kruse chef," and brian latell, author ofis

"castro's secrets," and they ar all great books.i go to the bookstore on the waym home or take out the ipad and te order them right now. i am looking forwards to hearing some experts on this topic thate we've heard a lot about. i'd like to talk about the work on the motives going further back, and perhaps, you can tell us about why the cuban missilebc crisis started. started. >> thanks, mary. before i do that, i just say that with john f. kennedy having introduced this panel, it's a hard act to follow. i also wanted to say i used to work for the national archives and we don't often congratulate the national archives when it does a superb job and those of you watching tv and in the audience who saw the video

presentation, you should give a round of applause to tom putnam, director of the library and david, the head honcho of the entire archives and to stacy who is the curator, for that magnificent achievement. [ applause ] those of your tax dollars at work and you should be proud of it. all right. we have heard a lot about red lines. now that i don't work for the government i can talk about elections. we've heard a lot about red lines and establishing red lines and telling foreign countries you cannot step over this line and if you do, there will be a crisis. the reason that john f. kennedy had to respond forcefully to the deployment of nuclear missiles in cuba was that he had established a red line. in early september of 1962, he publicly said that the united states the installation of

offensive weapons which everyone understood to be missiles on the island of cuba. john f. kennedy when you look at hiss h him as a president, wanted to keep us away from the brink of war versus close to it. most policies were designed to push the nuclear threshold away. why would he draw a red line that would actually make it likely that there might be a nuclear confrontation. he did it because he thought the soviets weren't going to do it. he used a back channel to speak with the soviet leadership and had said, look, you know, i have heard rumors that there will be missiles in cuba. we assume you're not doing that because you know what the consequencie ins will be. the soviets mounted a fine deception campaign said we would never put missiles in cuba thinking they would never put missiles in cuba or that at

least his public statement would deter them from any future effort to do so he goes public in early september. that's a big problem for him. there's a midterm election in 1962. john f. kennedy is having a hard time pushing his legislative agenda. the democratic party was two parties. a southern party and northern liberal party. that party did not work well together. he wanted more kennedy liberals and progressives to be elected. the gop was taking advantage of the cuban issue. kennedy is now out and he's out on a limb and that's when he finds out that the soviets have put missiles in cuba. no choice to react strongly. people would say mr. president didn't you just say that you would not count instances. not only did he react for midterm election reasons but he had to react for alliance reasons. a his allies would wonder about his guarantees.

how would the soviets react if after public ply saying he wouldn't accept those things, privately he did. it's a lesson for other presidents too. that's the dilemma for john kennedy. the dilemma for khrushchev is that he was in a box of his own. his box was different. he had basically decided to move ahead with one kind of missile over another meaning the soviet union was far weaker than the united states in 1961 and 1962. the american power that he saw around the world he felt threatened him and threatened his allies. cuba was one of them. as the soviet records have shown, it wasn't just about cuba. it was about a lot of things. not simply cuba. khrushchev wanted to find a quick fix to send a message to the united states to stop pushing us around and to be sure

that the great symbol of the youth of the revolution cuba would not be taken over. so he is in a box and he sends the missiles and unfortunately he sends them secretly, lies to kennedy, and before you know it, they're at the brink of war. >> over to jim for more on this topic of khrushchev's motives. what inspired him to put missiles in cuba? >> as tim and his co-author have written at great length, it was several reasons. he was gambler as cia speculated. he saw an array of issues and thought sending missiles to cuba could solve all of them and elevate his own standings. it's not one or another reason. it's a whole series. as tim wrote, it's like the mystery is who done it? all of them.

it was to deter an american invasion of cuba. it would save the cuba revolution. it was revealed in late 1961. it was a general offensive strategy in the cold war which he had spoken of in early 1962. it was showing up chinese who were accusing him personally and the soviets of weakness under the code name revisionism. this would show up on the chinese. the soviets could take action. it would also deal with the soviet economic plight. the agricultural program was not going well. this was way to gain security on the cheap. extend the nuclear umbrella and yet spend a lot less than sending untold numbers of soviet conventional forces to cuba. and there was a secret crisis in soviet cuban relations. the cubans were leaning a little bit toward the chinese.

there was tension between castro and the pro-mosque cuban party and the soviet ambassador was on the verge of being evicted and reinforcing that alliance is something that send missiles would do. khrushchev had a series of motives. if americans find this out, they won't stand for it. >> i wonder if you could share what you think are the key moments in the narrative of the crisis but also address the larger question, is this really a story of individuals and their choices or greater historical forces at work and the individuals don't really have much to say in what's going on. >> the key moment in the crisis was of course today exactly today 50 years ago, which was the day that we discovered that khrushchev had been lying to us and had deployed nuclear weapons in cuba.

the cia analyzes it the following day on the 15th. they don't tell kennedy immediately. the 3:00 a.m. moment actually does not come at 3:00 a.m. when they discover it but at 8:00 a.m. the next morning because they think that they'll give the president a good night sleep because he'll need it over the next two weeks. and then there's a week of private decision making, which was very important. the americans had the luxury of being able to think for a week about what they were going to do about this challenge. had they decided immediately as the president indicated in those remarks you heard, the decision would probably have been different. they would probably have attacked the missile sites. so there was a week of deciding what they would do about it. then the blockade is implemented and the peak of the crisis is on october 27th. it was called black saturday

when many things started happening that nobody had really predicted and to answer the second part of your question, i think this is the drama of the missile crisis. it's the drama of individuals, leaders, khrushchev and kennedy who end up thinking in very similar terms. they both brought the world to the edge of the abyss and they both wanted to bring it back. they've got no interest in unleashing of war. in the meantime, they've unleashed all of the forces they cannot control. they do not fully control their military. neither kennedy or khrushchev fully appreciates what is happening in cuba. when i researched my book "one minute to midnight" what struck me is what was happening in the oval office and what was actually happening on the ground. there were many things that the president didn't understand. there is famous watergate

question, what did the president know and when did he know it? is 8,000 soviet troops on the island. in fact, there were 42,000. he thought they were only armed with missiles that could reach the territory of the united states. in fact, they had '98 tactical nuclear missiles that would have been used to wipe you is and you know soviet unio. a u-2 spy plane on black saturday, the most dangerous day of the crisis. e didn't know there was a >> we didn't know there was a consultation in the caribbean between the u.s.th navy and thog trying to bring up americanrican submarines soviet submarines that were armed with nuclear torpedoes. so there were all these things that the president didn't know. and similarly on the soviet

side. kennedy, one of his great qualities, was that he had an instinctive knowledge of these things. he understood that things go wrong. and he derived that understanding from his experience in the military during world war ii. he liked to say the military always screws up. and that wasn't just an intellectual understanding. it was something that he had seen in the south pacific commanding a pt boat. it was that feeling that events are getting out of control that both he and khrushchev shared and that's what led them to bring the crisis to the end after the aharrowing events of black saturday. >> i would like to go to brian. in a previous life before he became an author and started teaching at the university of miami, was the cuban analyst for the cia and spent a great deal

of his life thinking about what castro was doing and castro's motives. i would be interested in what you think cast rows motives were in this crisis and what he viewed as important points in its unfolding. >> mary, castro in one of his recollections about the crisis said that those days his gorilla instincts came back to the fore. he was in the mood of a warrior. he was militant. he was volatile. as khrushchev and kennedy were struggling during the last few days to resolve the crisis without resorting to war, fidel castro was stimulating military conflict. castro on the morning of october 27th, black saturday that we keep hearing about, the most dangerous day of the missile crisis, black saturday, fidel castro ordered all of his

artillery to begin firing on american reconnaissance aircraft at sunrise that morning of black saturday. he said -- fidel castro said later on the record that war began in those moments. the commander of one of the generals of one of the soviet generals with the ex-ppeditiona force said the same thing. we all agreed that conflict -- military conflict began that morning. october 27th, black saturday, kennedy and khrushchev are desperately trying to bring this crisis to a peaceful end and castro is stoking the fan of conflict. he was so persuasive with his

counterparts, that later that day, black saturday, the u-2 was shut down. we saw earlier in the video that the u-2 was shot down. it's interesting. nikita khrushchev believed until his death that fidel castro personally ordered the shootdown by a soviet ground to air missile site. khrushchev believed that castro had somehow been responsible for it himself. apparently he was not. it was a soviet commander that gave the order to fire the missile. it was in the spirit of joint conflict, soviet military and the cuban military were now essentially resisting the americans as one. the general said it was amazing that we were prepared. we soviet forces including himself, the general, we were prepared if the americans invaded, we were prepared to fight as hard as we could and

then to go into the mountains of cuba and to fight to the death as guerrillas with our cuban comrades. a soviet general said that. arthur schlesinger summed it up nicely in something he wrote later. he said by black saturday, psychologically, fidel castro had come to dominate most of the soviet leadership in cuba. fidel was that percent persuasive and that mezmorizing that they were beginning to follow his bidding if not his actual orders. the general said we were inspired by fidel castro's revolutionary legitimacy.

castro ordered the first shots that were fired on the american aircraft. he was partly responsible he later admitted -- he admitted he was partly responsible for the shoot down of the u-2 and wrote later that evening, black saturday, he wrote what is commonly known as armageddon letter to khrushchev. he went on the 26th, the night of the 26th, and was there until dawn on the 27th. he dictated a letter. it's called the armageddon letter. he recommended to khrushchev that if cuba is invaded by the american, khrushchev should not hesitate but to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on american targets. i don't think that castro was irrational. i think he was wildly ido sick

karatic. it wasn't irrational. he knew the tactical nuclear weapons were on the ground in cuba. he really wanted those weapons. he later said had i been in charge and if the americans had invaded, i would have ordered the tactical nuclear weapons fired on american invading forces. so castro's letter of the armageddon recommending a first preemptive nuclear strike on the united states apparently assumed -- fidel castro apparently assumed when the american invade, nuclear weapons are going to be fired on the battlefield. the soviet union, the soviet general staff, should not wait after those weapons are fired for an american nuclear strategic nuclear assault on soviet military and civilian targets. that was fidel castro. he came to dominate the missile crisis during its final day. black saturday. >> jim wants to jump in on that

point. >> yeah. thank you, brian, for bringing us to the most dangerous day in human history. saturday, october 27th. i can follow up precisely what happened when that armageddon letter reached nikita khrushchev. to do so, we don't have an empty chair. that idea was taken for this year. i would like to bring up on stage a missing witness that all of those wonderful, critical world history conferences in the late 1980s and late 1990s and that of course is nikita khrushchev. i'll read to you a passage not from the smuggled out memoirs of nikita khrushchev that were tape recorded after he was deposed in 1954 and published in the west many years later. the armageddon letter was disclosed in a volume of tape

recorded memoirs in 1990. castro denied he asked for preemptive strike but it was later clear that you should unleash any means because his view was world war iii was starting. a few days later on october 30th, 1962, in the kremlin, nikita khrushchev gave his own version of what happened. the record i'm going to read to you from is from a document that was found in the archives in prague. it will be published this week for the first time along with 850 pages of other nonamerican, non-u.s. translated documents from communist countries and other countries more than 24 around the world by the cold war history project. it's available for free on their website at woodrow wilson center

in washington. khrushchev explained what happened to the leader. he said the following. he said in a letter fidel castro said we should be the first to start an atomic war? do you know what that would mean? we were come plpletely aghast. after all, if a war started, it would primarily be cuba that would vanish from the face of the earth. at the same time, it is clear that with the first strike, one cannot today knock the opponent out of the fight. goes on to say what would we gain if we ourselves started a war? after all, millions of people would die in our country too. can we even contemplate a thing like that? could we allow ourselves to threaten the world of socialism which was hard won by the working class only a person who has no idea what nuclear war means or who has been so blinded for instance by castro and by revolutionary passion could talk like that. we did not, of course, take up that proposal especially because we had a chance to avert war.

and there were other passages that essentially make it seem that nikita khrushchev was the adult and fidel castro was the hot headed teenager who wanted the car keys and bully in a schoolyard fight. >> part of the reason castro acted this way -- by the way, that armageddon letter was the product of a four or five-hour session where they were drinking beer and eating cuban sausages. i don't know what it is about eating cuban sausages and drinking beer that leads you to the edge of nuclear war. >> was rum involved? >> it should have been rum but beer is what's remembered. cubans were not involved at all. they became angrier and angrier that the two superpowers would make a decision over their heads. so whatever castro's basic

revolutionary, there is no doubt that the warrior castro comes out because he's really angry. he's been insulted. primarily by his ally, the soviet union. i was going to make a point about the two adults. it's very important to understand at least -- let me try to persuade you to understand. both kennedy and khrushchev wanted to demilitarize the cold war. both of them for different reasons felt the militaries had played too large a role in the cold war to that point. kennedy had a problem with the joint chiefs of staff. you saw some of that played out. this is a very deep problem. there is an assumption sometimes in american history that military leaders know best on what to do. i can't comment on the the current military leaders of the united states.

i can tell you that if either dwight eisenhower or john f. kennedy followed advice of the joint chiefs of staff and their era, we would have had a nuclear war. american military leaders, these were men who fought in world war ii and in thinking they were prenuclear. this was the problem. they won a war. they were heroes. they won a conventional war and they applied the same logic to a nuclear era. one thing john kennedy said to his first presidential biographer, william manchester, i have to be a different kind of president even from dwight eisenhower. i'm the first nuclear aged president. he said in that little interview, there aren't total solutions. what he meant was in this era, if you seek a total solution, you may end up with a total cla calamity. you have to be ready to find common ground. kennedy felt that way. everything we know from the

soviet union proves that khrushchev felt the same way. how fortunate were we those were the two people. how fortunate that they were the two people in charge at a moment like that in u.s. world history. >> and not fidel castro. may i say one more thing to close out the point that jim and i were making. is it even wonder then given what we've said about fidel castro's behavior especially on that last day, black saturday, is it any wonder that khrushchev was suddenly in a great hurry to settle the crisis peacefully? he did that by the next day. he could have gotten a better deal from kennedy especially with regard to the jupiters and turkey. khrushchev was in a hurry. he was desperately afraid that he was playing with fire.

fidel had some responsibility for the shoot down of the u-2. fidel wrote the bizarre letter advocating a preemptive nuclear attack. and perhaps worst of all if it's possible, soviet commanders on the ground in cuba were losing command and control of their own forces. soviet forces were becoming more and more responsive to castro and the cubans and not to their own commanders. not to moscow. it's no wonder that the crisis ended when it did and we can thank fidel coastro for that. >> would you agree with jim's statements that khrushchev was the adult and castro was the hot headed teenager wanting the keys to the car? >> that was the perception certainly. >> i have never thought of fidel castro as a teenager. >> that was certainly not only khrushchev but the idea of

leaving nuclear weapons in people's hands. he was the chief lieutenant and trouble shooter and who khrushchev sent to havana to mullify castro. all were greatly upset as to what they viewed as the collapse by the soviets. another document that we're publishing this week, the fashion icon of later years, told the yugoslav ambassador, they should have told americans if you fire at our ships, if you fire at our forces, we won't just use our tactical nuclear weapons. we'll nuke new york. that will be our response. and he expressed regret that the cubans didn't have control because we could have used them. i want to emphasize what tim said. i've been following evidence

since the end of the cold war. if i was to summarize what they say about kennedy and khrushchev and missile crisis in one passage. kennedy and khrushchev look worse for their actions before the crisis. kennedy, because more has come out about the covert operations military planning, assassination plotting, that he approved against castro even though cuba wasn't a threat to national security and gave cubans and soviets reasonable fears even if it was not intended. both look worse for their actions before the crisis. both kennedy and khrushchev look better for how they managed to come to a common language to resolve the crisis peacefully. kennedy is very belligerent. he comes to the idea of let's start with the blockade to give

time for final steps. khrushchev has the best time to react as tim and michael have written. when he's first informed that the americans have discovered the missiles on october 22nd, the reaction is belligerent. we won't stop our ships. he only has two days to change his mind. and to start backing off. and so it is really an amazing story of those two leaders going from irresponsibility not thinking through consequences of their action to finding a common language just in time. >> i wanted to -- not only those two leaders but talking about castro and assassination attempts. perhaps a question for michael and brian. what was the thinking behind those and what role did they play in setting conditions that led to this crisis? >> the assassination attempt actually -- i didn't think the cuban leadership was aware of the assassination attempts at this stage as far as i remember. the cuban leadership was aware

of the campaign of sabotage against the castro regime. and it wasn't very effective. there was one of the americans that said it was only a psychological self in action for not doing anything. as far as cubans were concerned and as far as russian patrons were concerned, it was -- it sent the message that the americans were determined one way or the other to overthrow the castro regime in cuba. that was central to soviet and cuban decision making in the missile crisis. i just would like to add to one point that has been made about kennedy and khrushchev being the adults in the room. they made a lot of mistakes in bringing the world to this point. during the 13 days, i see them as being on the same side.

graham, who you will hear from from in the next panel, he talked about rational actors. khrushchev and kennedy were both rational actors but there were a lot of irrational actors, too. it was this contest tweent the rational actors and irrational actors that is central to the cuban missile crisis. who can you put in the irrational actors? fidel was irrational. but there were those who stumbled into -- pilot who is didn't receive -- who the two leaders could not control. a whole lot of irrational things happening. thank god on the last day the o rational adults -- rational actors, the who adults in the room, managed to get control of this and bring it to an end. and that, they had something in common. >> i would say, though, it is very important because it makes the story much more colorful that both adults and adults, i think, do this on occasion, change their minds. and i would -- i think that it

took kennedy a little longer to actually makup his mind to go with the quarantine than some would assume. it took him a whole week. and he wasn't even sure until the very end. and he became suren the u.s. air force, and he asked the air force, can you in a surgical strike get rid of all of the missiles? they said, no. about a 75%, 80% chance. and then he asked, what would be the consequence if the soviets used their remaining missiles against the united states? oh, sir, about 30 million people might die in the southeastern portion of thenited states. kennedy recognized, because by that point a number of the soviet missiles were operational in cuba. they had not been. he recognized as president of the united states he could not take such a risk. but for the entire week what nagged at him is, okay, i put in this blockade, but khrushchev

could just keep the missiles there? how do i know the threat of war will be enough to move khrushchev because kennedy couldn't predict khrushchev was an adult in the room? and on the other side, khrushchev for the very first moments, and for the soviets it's not two weeks, it's only one week, khrushchev is really nervous and talking about using tactical nuclear weapons against an american attack. now, he changes his mind. to go back to mokoyan plays a very important role in softening nikita's top edges. mikoyan plays a role in trying to make policy toward soviet submarines more sensible. so khrushchev and kennedy are not just adults but human beings. and what's great about this crisis is that time worked on the side of rationality.

time for everybody to think about the consequences of their action. and the world benefitted. >> can i add one point? we shouldn't have such a divide between rational and kremlin and fidel and irrational. like hutchfy bogart coming to the water, he was uninformed. he believed khrushchev shared his view, this was the first salvo of world war iii and simple military logic to get in the first blow. he didn't understand that much like dwight eisenhower wasn't going to send in the cavalry to save them from hungary in 1976 but reap maximum propaganda from it. the soviets were going to destroy moscow and, he was going

to get maximum propaganda advantage and it would be an unfortunate outcome. but there was a not entirely irrational and john f. kennedy and nikita khrushchev were in what appears to be pretty irrational system of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterren deterrents -- >> he did -- >> to some extent. >> kennedy says it is completely crazy two men 8,000 miles apart are able to blow up the world. he thought that whole thing was completely crazy. the missile crisis led him to change his views, the rationality of war and he expresses that the next year at his speech at the american university. >> i think he believed it a lot before the cuban missile crisis but america was a hawkish country and kennedy was very sensitive to the fact that even

privately, the evidence is overwhelming, by the way, because he told the soviets he felt this way, privately he thought this nuclear nonsense, this was nuclear nonsense. publicly, in america, if you don't seem strong, you don't use strong, hawkish language, blah, blah, blah, you seem weak as a president. what about presidents that understand dilemmas, that bd the world is complicated? kennedy did. the evidence is overwhelmingly but he couldn't say it public, michael, until after the cuban missile crisis because he got his chops during the cuban missile crisis. before the cuban missile crisis he was not known as a good foreign president. it was the cuban missile crisis that ail lus him to say at american university in june of 1963 what he really thinks about the cold war. >> and a year later for stanley kubrick to put out "dr. strange love". >> so he should think nikita khrushchev?

>> absolutely. >> i knew it. >> i would to hear from brian about assassination attempts on castro, and then we'll come back to you, michael, i promise. >> i do get into that in some detail in castro's secrets, my new book. the most well developed, most serious, well planned assassination attempt occurred in 1963. a year after the missile crisis. there was a cuban, he's still alive, he lives miami, he lived in spain. i interviewed him in miami. he was the chosen assassin in the eyes of the cia and in the eyes, i think, of robert kennedy. kuvello was the ideal -- seen as at ideal assassin to kill castro after several other attempts had failed in earlier years, but

kubello was the ideal candidate in their eyes. he had already killed in cold blod. he had murdered a batista colonel in 1976, savage attack at a havana nightclub. when i met this man, he showed me the car, the wound from his own war experience as a guerrilla. the scar ran down -- all of his shoulder to his bicep. he was a commonen dant. he was a friend of both castro brothers. he was the perfect candidate, the best one the cia ever had to assassinate fidel. he had a beach place that he used right next to one that fidel used. and all he had to do was get close enough to fidel to kill him. the cia recruited this man. he was known in the literature and declassified clliterature

am-nash, that was the crypt for this man. he had a number of cia case officers in south america and in europe. he was trained in demolitions in france. he went to an american air base in the south of france. he was taught demolitions and explosives by the agency. and he met in october 1963 with one of the highest level officials of the cia. this man's name was desmond fits girl. dez traveled to europe, met in a safehouse with kubella and fitzgerald told him, i'm robert kennedy's personal representative in this meeting. about a month later the case officer, cia case officer working for desmond fitzgerald was in paris, in the same safe

house, meeting the same rolando kublla, november 22, 1963, when they met. and sanchez, who i actually interviewed, retired cia case officer, fluent in spanish, he was meeting with kubella and giving him final instructions of the assassination for fidel castro. as they're getting to the point, sanchez reaches into his pocket, conveniently, i have it right here, he reaches into his pocket and he pulls out a pen. it's a papermate pen. but it's not really a pen. instead of an ink cartridge, there is a syringe inside of this papermate pen. sanchez tells kubella, all you have to do is fill the syringe with poison. the next time you see fidel, likely scratch him. the needle on the pen is that fine. a light scratch with the right poison may very well kill fidel.

the moment is so dramatic because the phone rings in the cia safehouse and it's desmond fitzgerald. he's in washington. sanchez picks up the phone and his boss fitzgerald tells him, terminate the operation. president kennedy has just been killed in dallas. the remarkable coincidence of events. but fidel castro, i have to say one more thing, michael, fidel castro knew all of this. he knew that bobby kennedy had a role in it. he knew the cia was plotting his assassination because i demonstrate, i prove beyond any doubt in my new book that rolando kubell, the assassin was a double agent, working for fidel castro all along. >> so, this is just to repeat, you said, a year after the end of the cuban missile crisis. >> a year after the missile

crisis. >> we don't want to exaggerate the peace, love and understanding that breaks out. >> the policy toward cuba is such that it would be simultaneously involved in plotting castro's assassination but also in a hidden mostly indirect dialogue with havana to explore the possibility of some sort of -- and peter is going to be telling this story in his forthcoming book, much of this is leaked out, including the fact that even as am-lash was being prepared for an assassination, there was an initiative through a reporter, lisa howard, to communicate a message and a french reporter who had just met with jfk was passing a message to fidel. i want to go back to the missile crisis. one of the least explored on the missile crisis, even new evidence is emerging this week from the kennedy library, one option from the beginning to the end of the 13 days was, should we try to get a message to fidel to basically communicate the

following -- the united states by this point had broken diplomatic relations with cuba, there's no u.s. embassy in havana. the u.s. after the failure of the bay of pig hs done its best to isolate cuba diplomatically through the american states, imposed economic blockade and yet there was fitful communications. all through the 13 days there is the idea f we can get word to fidel, if you could kick the soviets out, everything else can flow from that in terms of being we will komd back into the hemisphere. and the whole story climaxed on that same october 27th. the u.s. passed a message, approved by excomm to brazilian government, on blank stationery, no letterhead, typed in portuguese saying type this personally, not because the cia is intercepting all of your cables but if you could send an emissary to fidel, present this as your proposal, we will back

it up. it so happened the emissary was sent. met with fidel, came to the brazilian embassy but he didn't understand those words were approved by john f. kennedy. it shows how desperate kennedy was, at the same time he was plotting for an invasion, sending the message via bobby kennedy compromise on turkish, going to the u.n., through that channel. was also tryingo send word to fidel. it just shows he didn't think any of it would work. we're all lucky we didn't get to find out what would have happened. >> right. there was a lot that was contradictory about u.s. policy and kennedy's own policy but he was firm on one thing, which is that he didn't have much time left. here i disagree with tim that says time was running in favor of the rational actors. that may have been the case at the beginning of the crisis but by the end of the crisis, by black saturday, i think things were getting out of control. and both kennedy and khrushchev

realized this. they were in the position of abraham lincoln in the civil war who says, i don't control events. events control me. there were so many different things happening. we were moving to higher levels of nuclear alert. when you move to higher levels of nuclear alert, accidents can happen. nuclear missiles and warheads were moving around cuba. neither leader fully understood what was happening. and that is why they understood chaotic forces could take over and they had to bring it to an end. that's why they ended up giving a little more -- if they stuck it out for a few more days, they might have got the other side to back down more completely. but they wouldn't take that. neither of them were willing to take that risk. >> now, 13 days was just about right. my fear is it would have been a three-day crisis. if it would have been a three-day cries, it would have been a war. the challenge for each leader

was to figure out the turning point. one thing you'll see f you go through and look at the records of both soviet and american decision-making is that when the soviets were afraid kennedy was about to attack, that's when khrushchev was looking for a diplomatic settlement. and then when the soviets got a little more confident that maybe kennedy was not that irrational, then they upped the ante and said, well, maybe we could get turkish missiles or maybe we can get them to close their base in pakistan or what have you. once both sides realized that war was nye, but it was their ability to make decisions and not go with the rash reaction. kennedy was really mad when those missiles were put in because he went public about how he said they wouldn't happen. khrushchev is nervous when he heard kennedy was about to make a speech because he didn't know what he was about to announce.

this-h those men acted on their initial passions, the world would have been a different place in 1962. that's what i meant by time -- >> time is absolutely crucial because for months, even years afterwards, khrushchev would be attacked by castro for giving in too fast. khrushchev's defense always was, this was necessary to save the piece. peace. i am a man of peace because i saved it. the cubans would say, no, he could have slowed down the process, consulted, accepted with the continue of allowing -- getting cuban consent for u.n. or other inspections of the removal of the missiles but khrushchev felt he was losing control. the great unknown and unknownable is when bobby kennedy on saturday night seized to bring him, he is giving a de facto ultimatum but they would never -- >> can you clarify that.

>> the soviet ambassador, he says we need a decision because an invasion is probable in 20 to 48 hours. khrushchev gives in even faster. i think it's highly likely, and i suspect they will agree, although i'm curious, that jfk was probably bluffing. he wouldn't have invaded. you could have tightened the embargo further to include further cuban goods, including petroleum and lubricants that kennedy having read "the guns of august", being so atune to what the cost of nuclear would have been, would have been unlikely to carry through. >> there's a myth i would like to -- my colleague david coleman has exploded it. did it a few years ago and did it again in a book. there's a myth about tactical nuclear weapons i would like to deal with because it's the answer to the question. the united states government knew there were tactical nuclear weapons with warheads on the island. that's what makes the u.s. military planning about cuba outrageous because they planned for the invasion of cuba as if

there were going to be in a nuclear environment. kennedy -- this is not the first time kennedy encountered this kind of military thinking. a year earlier over laos, when he was considering the invasion of laos for reasons we don't have to go into today, this is important, he was told there was a nuclear dimension that was just declassified three years ago. >> chinese women. >> the u.s. government was planning a nuclear war with china as part of its handling of laos. it wasn't going to happen immediately, and presidents actually predelegate the use of nuclear weapons. it's a myth the president has to press a button. there are ways to tell the military in advance you may use nuclear weapons under the following circumstances. in 1961 jfk was asked by the military to give permission for them to use nuclear weapons against china as part of this laos business.

he knew very well tactical nuclear weapons in the cold war had gotten out of hand. i don't doubt he understood in 1962 that if he let the u.s. military invade cuba, they would be in a nuclear environment just as they would have been in laos. so, i don't think it was a surprise to mcnamara. people have talked about how his memory has changed. it wasn't a surprise to mcnamara when he heard about this in 1992. he had just forgotten. it's not a surprise. so, that shows you the risk that the u.s. military would have taken without civilian loordship. something to keep in mind. >> the u.s. military knew there were frog missiles in cuba, which were nuclear capable. they didn't know nuclear warheads for these missiles were there. so it did come as a huge surprise to them 30 years later when they discovered that there were -- that there were actually tactical nuclear warheads in some of them, 98 of them. >> michael, the plan, the plan

that was brought from joint chiefs of staff on the 259 or 26th of october included the assumption that american forces would be met by nuclear tactical -- >> we discovered the nuclear capable frogs on the 25th. once we knew that the soviets had nuclear capable missile there, we didn't know if they were equipped with nuclear weaponsness, but as soon as that happened the american commanders started demanding tactical nuclear weapons of their own. in fact, we were in the early stages of a nuclear war at this point. particularly on the 27th. >> briefly -- >> let me -- >> the question i inflict on my poor undergrats in my u.s. foreign policy class is how dangerous was the cuban missile cries. they have to get into these kind of leads. i just want to make the broader point about so what, why is it so important? one of the questions is, what impact do nuclear weapons have in international affairs?

because those cuban missile crisis say the glass is half full. rational actors stopped it from getting out of control and nuclear deterrents kept everyone at bay so therefore we can rely on nuclear deterrents in the indefinite future. people say so many things could have gone wrong, and as the phrase, we survived on blind, dumb luck. so the goal for the future should be nuclear abolition. someone says, that makes the world safer for conventional war. the arguments about should we rely on nuclear deterrents forever or try to get rid of nuclear weapons because sooner or later something is going to go wrong in a crisis, a lot of it hinges on how you read the history of the cuban missile crisis. >> the closing question i wanted to ask is lessons of the crisis today. you started to answer that but i would like to give brian, tim and michael also a chance to answer it as well.

fidel castro was id oe sin accuratic, charismatic, unpredictable leader. if he had had nuclear weapons, which he aspired to november, which we know he wanted to keep the tactical nuclear weapons, and mikoyan -- khrushchev knew much better by then to let him have his own nuclear weapons. but if any leader like that today, say, the north koreans or the iranians, highly idiosyncratic militant, unpredictable leaders acquire nuclear weapons, how dangerous the world is going to be. mcnamara in -- what was it called in the video? "the shadow of war" -- "the fog of war," he says, we came that close to nuclear holocaust. and any other highly id oe sin

accuratic leader like castro could make the world a very dangerous place. >> there are countries that will bluf they have more nuclear weapons or mruf they have more than they actually have in order to keep you away. if you react on the bluff, you can actually militarize a situation that doesn't require a military approach but a diplomatic one. look at saddam hussein. saddam hussein pretended to have nuclear weapons because he was afraid of us and he was afraid of other people in the middle east. he was doing the same thing that nikita khrushchev pretended to be. you're fearful of american power. our very existence is a powerful, successful country is threatening to other countries. whether we like it or not, we can be ourselves. that's one lesson which is, be

careful of how you act on bluff. the second is, presidents should be allowed to koch myself on minor points. jfk was prepared to compromise. and he was prepared to think about what the other side needed for there to be a lasting settle many. that's a great talent in a president. i think one lesson is the same as the lesson kennedy himself drew during the missile crisis which is don't get into a war unless you're very sure about what is going to happen. in the case of a nuclear war, you can't be. so don't get into it unless you can explain in advance of to the american people what you're doing. and i think so that lesson was ignored subsequently in american history and i think it's still a lesson that we should remember today. >> i'm afraid our time is up so

and we will hear from the pew center about absentee voting with david becker. "washington journal" begins every day at 7:00 a.m. on

c-span. a recent cato institute study finds that tea party supporters are united on the economic issues that divided on social issues. on tuesday, the think tank will discuss the report. see it live starting at 4:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> i watch c-span because when i want to get the news without a lot of talk and pundits adding their point of view, i can get the original script from a person, and then i can come to my own conclusions. which i think it's much better than having someone else tell me what i should think. >> c-span, created by america's cable company since 1979, brought you as a public service by your television provider. >> this isn't about governor bush. it's not about me. it is about you.

i want to come back to something that i said before. if you want somebody who believes that we were better off eight years ago than we are now common that we ought to go back to the kind of policies that we have had back then, emphasizing tax cuts for the wealthy, here is your man. if you want somebody who will fight for you and who will fight to have middle-class tax cuts, then i am your man. now, i doubt anyone here makes more than 300 30,000 dollars a year. if you do, you are in the top 1%. >> i'm not going to ask. [laughter] >> but everyone here in this audience was dead on in the middle of the middle class, then the tax cuts for every single one of you all added up be less than the tax cut his plan would give to just one member of that

top wealthiest 1%. now, you judge for yourself whether or not that's fair. >> 50 million americans get no tax relief under this plan. >> the presidential town hall debate began in 1992. governor bill clinton and ross perot. presidential hopefuls have taken questions from undecided voters in the same town hall style. tuesday night, watch obama and romney in their debate. c-span coverage starts at 7:00 p.m. eastern. >> next, graham allison of harvard university discusses the 50th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. and what was learned from that conflict. from "washington journal", this

is 40 minutes. >> host: doctor graham allison is the director for science and international affairs at harvard university. he joins us from boston. to talk about the 50 anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. good morning, and refresh for us, remind us what was so momentous about those days in october 50 years ago? >> guest: thank you for having me on. it is interesting to try to imagine october of 1962. but this is what historians agree is the most dangerous moment in human history. president kennedy said to his brother in the midst of the crisis that he thought that the chances of war were somewhere between one and three and even. a nuclear war at that time could have meant the death of many people. this is an iconic event a u.s.

spy plane attempts to sneak missiles into cuba. something they did they wouldn't do. kennedy and his closest colleagues meet with the executive committee of the national security council. at the end of the week, he chooses to announce to the world that the u.s. has discovered the soviet union in the midst of this activity and to impose a blockade. there is a week as tensions mount where the parties, kennedy and khrushchev, stood eyeball to eyeball. at the end of the second week, the 27th of october, kennedy comes up with a remarkable final offer. on the 28th, the sunday, khrushchev announces the missiles will be withdrawn. so during the period of 13 days, the world was stuck to the edge of a nuclear war, which, if it

would've occurred, would have meant the death of 100 million americans. >> host: graham allison, how much was happening before the public eye and how much behind-the-scenes? within a historical study, there is a long evolutionary process. clearly, long before kennedy was aware of it, the soviets were installing these missiles in cuba. kennedy became aware of this on the 16th of october. he then had a week of secret, private deliberations to try to figure out what to do. it is very interesting to compare it with the world today. where in general, most people in washington would imagine that if something like this were to be discovered of such proportions, maybe it would leak in 48 hours or maybe 72.

but the idea of one week of private deliberations almost seems antique. nonetheless, if kennedy had had to choose in the first 48 hours, there is no question that he would have gone with an airstrike followed by an invasion. what he would have discovered that he had chosen that route and conducted that operation was well and the hold, unbeknownst to him, the soviet troops in cuba, they had brought with them about 100 tactical nuclear weapons. and kennedy didn't even know they were there. that is something that was discovered by the historical analysis subsequently. those weapons would've been used against the invading american troops. that is one of the trails to what had become a nuclear war. the idea of having some time to think and delivery, to have an initial judgment, to look at the evidence and think harder about this, kennedy kept saying that

we do this, this won't be the end of the game, then he will do something and it will be something. down each of these paths, as he thought about it, he knew it at the end of that was crouched over many american cities. mushroom clouds. he had the time to deliberate and think about it. time for people to disagree. it was crucial to successful crisis management in that case. i think that to whatever extent that has been lost in the deliberative processes of government today, it is to our impoverishment. >> host: how was the crisis defused, professor graham allison? >> guest: that is a long story, but i will try to be brief about it. it was installed on the 22nd of october, a great speech, as i'm sure the next couple of weeks will roll out, it will get played more than once on tv.

but you can go to a website that we put up. belfercenter.org. even links to the secret tapes that kennedy made of these deliberations. which raise questions about the ethics about, there is a fantastic opportunity to be a fly on the wall listening to people to liberate about things that could've led to nuclear war. in any case, he goes into operation. the naval blockade of cuba prevents this shipment of any new missiles. but the problem is, there are any missiles and nuclear warheads in cuba. once kennedy announces that, chris jeff rushes to complete them so they would be ready to fire against american cities.

kennedy is determined that they are not going to get to that point because then they will just be there. finally, you get to saturday, the 27th of october. if you are picking a single day of the most dangerous day in history, that was it. so he comes to the meeting with his advisers in the morning. he gets informed that a u.s. plane is flying over cuba trying to figure out what the soviets are rushing these missiles to put completion. he has given previously standing orders, facilities on the ground, otherwise, it will attack the next thing. that order is interrupted.

he said, let me have a little bit more time to think about this. he is then told that without his knowledge or order, he is flying over the soviet union, and they got off track when they were in alaska. here it is flying over the soviet union in a manner that could appear to chris jeff, and it appeared to him, as he sent this letter the day after, like a last-minute look at targets if you are going to attack. things are getting out of control. in the debate among his advisers, there are two options that are presented to him. only two options. attack the missiles in cuba now to prevent them becoming ready to fire against american cities, or, alternatively, acquiesced to the fact that chris jeff has succeeded and there are through tedious missiles in cuba and he will be emboldened to take action against berlin. so he is damned if he does and

darned if he doesn't. and if they do that, what are we going to do -- they get down to nuclear war. so what if i acquiesced to the missiles in cuba? just this fact, they think well, then chris jeff will have succeeded in doing something, but this guy will be emboldened to act next month. in berlin nikita khrushchev held all the cards. so it was, he was damned if he

did and damned if he didn't. in this last-minute, his advisors were unable to come up with any options. in the last minute in the evening, kennedy came up with a third option. one that he personally would have rejected a week earlier. which was an ugly option in his view. but nonetheless, it succeeded in resolving the conflict. and the option consisted of three components. a public deal, a private ultimatum, and a secret sweetener. so the public deal was that khrushchev announces withdrawal of the missiles in cuba. kennedy pledges not to invade cuba. ..

>> he was afraid he was not going to make the 24-hour cycle and was afraid the missiles would be withdrawn. there's more to the story than that, but that's the core. >> host: directer of harvard university for science and international affairs. they have a website set up, cubanmissilecrisis.org marking the 50th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. our guest is also the arian thousand of the book "essence of decision" explaning the cuban missile crisis that came out in

1971, but was updated and revised in 1999. let's take a listen to president john f. kennedy addressing the nation back on october 22, 1962 #. >> our policy has been one of patients and restraint. as be fits a peaceful and powerful nation which leads a worldwide alliance. we have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere arrogance and fanatics, but now further action is required, and it is underway, and these actions may only be the beginning. we will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the course of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth, but neither will we shrink from the risk at any time it must be faced. >> host: president kennedy addressing the nation on the eve

of the day that the cuban missile crisis was nearing its peak. let's go to the phones for calls. leo is on the republicans' line, hi, leo. >> caller: good morning. >> host: morning. >> caller: question for the professor. wouldn't it be true that the cue ban -- kennedy handled the cuban missile crisis well. i think most historians agree on that, but it might never have happen if he didn't botch the bay of pigs invasion in 19611. number one, there wouldn't have been place to put the missiles because cuba would have been free, and, number two, he would have had more respect for kennedy when kennedy failed to support the invasion in 61, you know, with american military power, while probably saw kennedy being weaker, and, you

know, that made him think maybe he would get away with putting missiles in cuba, and, again, he wouldn't have had any place to put them if the mission succeeded and cuba was free rather than a soviet satellite; correct? >> guest: excellent. a tough and good question. essentially, that's correct in my view. just to remind people because most people don't remember the bay of pigs, but kennedy was inaugurated in january of 1961. he was a young man, was a senator, didn't really have any experience in managing government. within three months after coming into office, he was presented with this plan for the bay of pigs which was said to have been developed under the eisenhower administration by cia in which cuban immigrants were going to invade cuba, and the u.s. would be covertly involved as a cia

operation, but not overly, liberating cuba, but it was a botched operation as you said correctly, and the air strikes that caa thought the u.s. was prepared to conduct to back it up, kennedy was not prepared to do because then it would have become an over action against cuba rather than covert. it failed. castro survived. castro survived as a soviet ally in the caribbean, and that therefore a location where they could move missiles. if castro was overthrown in 196 # 1, there wouldn't have been a soviet ally in the western hemisphere with no place to put the missiles. i would say it reminds us of several things in my view. first, the first year of a new

president's term is precarious. republican or democrat, makes no difference. one of my colleagues at harvard who is now deceased, richard newstadt, the greatest student of the american presidency wrote about this what we called "transition phenomena," and transition mistakes where a new president comes to office, he'd never been president before, so how does he know what to do? he has not had the team of people working with him so when secretary of defense, in this case, bob mack that mare ray, a president of the ford foundation, and kennedy didn't know him, the chairman of the jcs, kennedy didn't know him. the head of cia, kennedy didn't know him. the secretary of state, dean russ, these people all getting to know each other and learn how they relate to each other, understand what somebody says something, how do you assess it and judge it.

kennedy, as a young, naive, new president fell into a mistake, both either he shouldn't have done it, or if he's going to do it, he should have done it in a way that was going to succeed, and the consequence of these initial transition errors are part of the history we look at afterwards thinking, wow, what about this? what about that? i would say for president bush, if you take a similar example, 1997, again, a new president, just got there, learning what they are doing. one year or less than a year after coming to office, and is completely befuddled by what occurs, and i think this is not an uncommon occurrence one of the reasons when you think about electing presidents, we have to be conscious that a new person comes into office, and they get training on the job, and there's no other alternative.

>> host: al in hudson, new york, on the independent line. hi, al. >> caller: good morning. >> host: good morning. >> caller: good morning, mr. alison. >> guest: hi. c-span: i was in the 8th grade, and i remember how even though i was in school we grew up with nuclear weapons over our head since the day i was born. >> guest: where were you in school, al? >> caller: well, the lakeman school district in new york. >> guest: in new york, okay. keep going, sorry. i was trying to get into the picture. the 8th grade, yeah? >> caller: yes. i remember it well because even though we were in classes, the classes were not functional, and basically, we were just sitting there and listened to almost the play-by-play, the ships out at sea, and so on, but the point i was leading to is this.

president kennedy, at that time, although he had been a new president, had seen the ugly face of war. he had participated. he had seen the price of war and the cost of victory. i remember well that his joint chiefs of staff, incoming the civilian and the military were saying go, go, go, and he pushed back, and he said, wait a minute, fellows, this could get damn ugly, and fortunately, it played out through all the diplomatic back channels and all of that so we were not incinerated. now, i remember the gulf, i remember 9/11, i remember how the war -- 9/11 went from a justified hit on afghanistan for bin laden, but then it went to iraq, and, again, we were lieded into a war, and my fear is this.

mitt romney has no experience as a political leader on the world stage. he has most of the neocons advising him that we're there with george bush. now, this iran thing with their nuclear weapons and israel could come to -- could come to a head, and would he have the maturity to push back and say, wait a minute, sanctions or just go in and bomb the crap out of them? you know, a fight that's not our fight basically. >> host: al, let's get a response. >> caller: i think you got ten very interesting points there, al, and if i were address each of them, if this was in the classroom, i would go through each one at a time, but i'll hit a couple small items here because you raise so many interesting things. i think first i would say just as a political scientist and

analyst, newstadt is right that any new president having never been president before, in the first year with the new national security team is living through a precarious transition. president obama did as well so that -- i just say that's life, and one of the considerations in thinking about the november 6 as well, we already paid to train one guy. he made some mistakes. he's learned. i think one of the great things about obama is he's a learner. looking at the decision making process in the first year for the afghan surge, it's clear that he's learning what to do and doesn't quite know what he's doing. reminds me quite a lot of the kennedy bay of pigs sort of process, and i think for romney, even though he's got executive experience in a different world, the first year would be a procare yows year, no question about that. second question is also

absolutely right. too frequently, presidents and their advisers, and i've had an opportunity to participate in this process, think of war as -- becomes sterile or distant opposed to thinking that you're sending fellow americans to kill and to die, and that's the hardest decision any president ever makes. it's one that president obama struggles with. it's one that president kennedy struggled with. it's one president bush struggled with. i think translating it as vividly as possible into what the consequences would be is part of the exercise that's required, and why the missile crisis is so instructive, and i think relative to the time, or i'm picking three of the 12 points, but why the missile crisis is instructive is that

when it starts, kennedy -- it's not just the military and the chiefs that want an air strike, he wants an air strike. the first two days, that's the only option he's thinking about. here in boston, the report -- robert kennedy personal papers opened at the jfk library this week, and i had a peek at them on wednesday or thursday. you see in bobby's personal notes, he's clear that we're attacking on the second or third day while people are deliberating. actually, that's so much the consensus in the room that when ad lay stevenson, the ambassador to the u.n. at the time comes in and learns about what's going on in and is read into the picture, he turns white. he's sure that's what's going to happen, and writes a very rambling, confused note to kennedy basically saying before you take the u.s. to war, think

carefully about what the consequences will be. in this period of deliberation, this becomes more vivid, and you heard the vividness of this in the clip that libby played so that by the end of this experience, kennedy and all of the other people that sort of looked over the brink,ing are sd by an existential experience in which they've fought vividly about being part of a historical process that ends up killing a couple hundred million people, and they are thinking what in the world? what kind of world is this? how much sense does this make? how did we ever get into this? kennedy's big lesson from the missile crisis was not that, okay, now we know how to do this. i practiced. let's do the next round. exactly the opposite.

the lesson from this was this is too dangerous for human beings to participate in. this -- we cannot do this again, as he said in the famous american university speech, his kind of best, most personal account of what he thought this should mean for all of the rest of us, he said, going forward, great powers must overt, not manage, overt confrontations that bring an adversary that forces an adversary to choose between humiliating retreat and war. i think if you go to iron, there's a very powerful analogy there. >> host: graham allison serving on the secretary of state, secretary of defense, and head of the cia.

in the past, peeves the assistant secretary of defense in the first clinton administration and had experience with a republican administration as a special adviser to the secretary of defense under president reagan. a question coming in on twitter says, "hasn't it been shown soviet field commanders in cuba had tactical nukes in u.s. troops began an assault?" >> guest: good question, and the answer is yes. again, it's quite hard to believe, but the soviets had sent 40,000 troops. we didn't know there were that many, or kennedy didn't know that many, to install the missiles, but also to protect them because they did not want castro to have anything to do with them, and there's another side story, a very interesting one, on the tussle between castro and when neither trusted each other much, but being

allies. in any case, the troops brought with them, as i mentioned earlier, about a hundred nuclear weapons, and both the physical control, that is the sense that if they used them, they work so there's no codes at the time, and the official authority to use these weapons. now, as the crisis developedded, and especially at the end of the crisis, the defense minister become nervous that, well, wait a minute, suppose the guy should use the weapons by, you know, by his own initiative or maybe even it could be an accident, and low and behold, where we come. there's a tussle about that at the end of the second week, but if, and as i mentioned before, if in the first 48 hours the u.s. conducted the air strike, which kennedy, i believe, would have chosen if forced to choose within 48 hours, and followed up with the invasion, i don't have any doubt those tactical nuclear

weapons would have been used against the americans, and that would have triggered a process that would have ended in nuclear war. in just one time thing about this, this was not unique for the soviet troops in cuba. at the time, again, this is a long time ago, in 1962, there were no electronic locks on nuclear weapons. there were no what is called today permissive action links so today when you see thezv presit wander around with this box or football so-called, he's supposed to release codes that then release in effect unlocks weapons that then allow them to be used at a local level. at the time, for the u.s. nuclear forces, there were, thanks to kennedy's having brought the u.s. to alert, the death con 2 so-called during the

missile crisis, they had basically loosened the safety catches on all the nuclear weapons, none of which had permissive action links or locks so there were sitting on runways in germany, in turk ky with german and turkish pilots, with nuclear bombs, fully loaded, if taken off, at their own initiative, they could have dropped them and been a trigger to war. >> host: another comment on twitter from january saying "i think all presidents learn on the job because they've never been in the situation before" echoing comments you made earlier. let's hear from don calling us from north carolina on the democrats' line. good morning, don. >> caller: good morning. i would like to ask the guest about an accident i was involved with which was in november of 1983, i was a ship leader on a

nato f-111 nuclear strike force, and we were in the middle of an exercise which was for nuclear forces only. it was called able archer, and, boy, at the time, there was some failure of monitoring by the soviet union, a glitch in the system, a war game scenario, and i remember the tension on the pad at the time, and that we came within just a few seconds of having a nuclear accident. the soviets once again in their planes, and they are stationed all forces forward, and they believe that reagan -- and it was during the height of the cold war, that reagan was, you know, kind of crazy, and he was maybe considering a first strike, and it was like a lower level colonel who couldn't

believe it and gave advice that the information they were receiving might be faulty, and it really -- but we were just a few seconds from facing nuclear disaster. >> host: let's hear from graham allison. >> guest: i think if we did the whole history of incidents, and this one i know just a little bit about, and i would love to hear more detail about it, don, because it's another good case study, there's a half dozen incidents, the cuban missile being the most dangerous, in which the u.s. and the soviet union approached the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in a manner that could have ultimately triggered war. i mean, to be clear, today, absolutely today, cold war is over for 20 years. the u.s. and russia maintain thousands of weapons on quick

alert in which they could be fired very quickly. now, they require unlocking for the lek tropic locks, and so they therefore, require permission, but there've even been near accidents with the posture that we have and they have today. particularly, when the soviet union was falling apart back in 1991, 1992, and 1993. i was in receiverring as assistant secretary -- serving as assistant secretary of defense at that time, and we worried greatly because the soviets, early warning system, it was basically blind for much of the horizon because the countries in which they had their radars had now become independent countries, not part of the soviet union, and therefore they could imagine if something was happening that we were attacking them, and if they imagined incorrectly that they

were being attacked by the u.s., they could launch their weapons, and low and behold, you have a war. one of the things that senator sam nun has been a leader in pressing for and which still has not been accomplished, today is to get the u.s. and russian weapons way back off of this sort of fast alert to give more decision time for a president or a leader of russia, not to have to react to what may be an accident or what may be faults or misleading signal, but to know for sure, and i think that's an important part of the agenda that president obama has articulated in this series of nuclear security summits, but something that's not yet been accomplished with russia. >> host: next caller from starksville, mississippi, on the republicans' line, john, go ahead. >> caller: yes, thank you. >> host: sure. >> caller: as someone who was a double major in history and

international relations, i'm sometime z surprised by how differently the two look at the same situation, and i veal a two-part question. one is being that how much of the history deals with the domestic political situation? in otherñhr words, if kennedy hd begin in own cuba, you know, would have been a disaster for the democrat party. i was wondering how much concern of that was given in this crisis. the second part, though, is what i was really more concerned about. if the fixed missiles in cuba was such a security threat, how is it that you and i andñ&r everybody else for decades lived with soviet ballistic missiles? submarines floating off the coasts. >> guest: two excellent questions, john. i would like your juxtaposition of history on the one hand and

political science because those clearly sometimes get separated. i would say in the missile crisis, the national security threat was so vivid and so dominant that it was the driver, but it was also the case that this is october 1962, just a month before a congressional election, a midterm election, that kennedy was very worried about, and he was being attacked at the time by two republican senators, keating and gephart because of the bay of pigs, which an earlier caller asked about, that he was weak about cuba, that we were letting the soviet union have a satellite in the western hemisphere, that he had not agented -- acted on it effectively in the bay of pigs. no question there was a little bit of a political overlay in

this, and at one stage, if you look at the documents that have now becomeñjr public, douglas dylan, secretary of the treasury and who is part of the conversation, writes a little note that i think he hands to bobby that says, "if you consider what the house of representatives is going to look like if we let them succeed with the bold venture?" there's a political element of this as is inevitably the case because our leaders are political leaders. on the second question, i'm sorry, i now forgot the second element. remind me, john. >> host: oh, sure. one aspect wasñ&r the politics,d the others were the subs off the coast. >> guest: oh, the subs, yeah, absolutely. that's a very interesting one, and, again, it's complicated. at the time, in the course of the debate that you could actually, because of the secret tapes, you can go back and

listen or to read the transcript and there's a good book dope by two of my colleagues, earnest may and phil zelico, also referenced on the website, but it's said at one stage, well, wait a minute, what's the difference between having missiles in cuba that could attack us and missiles in the soviet union that could attack us which we've been living with for a dozen years? i mean, in one case, there's a warhead that explodes from soviet union, another case, a warhead explodes from cuba. the target won't know the difference, same thing with the submarines, and that's a big issue and a big question because are you going to risk war up to and including nuclear war over something that is that similar to what you've already were living with in that was one of the things they struggled with the hardest. now, kennedy's analysis, and i

think this was ultimately correct that we, now, as historians, had a chance to learn more about it, his analysis was that soviet union tried to resolve the berlin dispute left over since world war ii. in november, he communicated in a letter that in november, after the election, we're going to resolve the berlin issue. berlin, as i said earlier, was a free oclave in the middle o&c( east germany. the soviets could close germany at any point, and united states would have to fight our way into, which we were committed to do. maybe you would say we shouldn't go to war over berlin either, and there was a debate at the time. how credible is it that you go to war over berlin risking boston or washington? any case, because of this

interconnectivity, kennedy felt that there was something qualitatively different between the missiles that were being snuck in to cuba in this wreckless venture, and the fact that sub ma reap -- sub ma reaps could operate in the ocean or missiles could operate in cuba. another less san he -- another lesson was to avert crisis going forward, both the u.s. and the soviet union needed to be clearer about what he called the, quote, "precarious rules of the status quo," close quote, by which he met the cop straints both -- constraints both explicit on the competition between the u.s. and the soviet soviet union such tht neither would surprise the other by a wreckless venture within

the other's zone of core interests. >> host: we'll have to leave it there. >> guest: that's what happened, yep. >> host: perfect conclusion. thank you so much. we'll have to leave it there because we're out of time up fortunately. thank you so much for joining us. graham lar the director of the bell center for science and international affairs talking about the 50th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. thank you, sir. >> guest: thank you for having me.

up next on c-span2, retired justice, john paul stevens, discuss the second amendment and gun laws, and the oral argument with the university of texas, a case challenges affirmative action policies in college admissions p. later, his tore yaps, journalists, and filmmakers mark the 50th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. >> i watch c-span because when i want to get the news without a lot of talk and pundits adding their point of view, i can get the original script from a person, and then i can come to my own conclusions which i think is better than having someone

else tell me what i should think. c-span, c-span2 #, and c-span2. 2 is booktv which i love, and 3 is the history challenge doing a civil war series, but sometimes i want to visit the senate and see what the house is doing, and so i look at c-span for those kinds of things too. sandra parker mitchell watches c-span on verizon. c-span, created by america's cable companies in 1979, brought to you as a public service by your television provider. tuesday, national journal hosted a&"snumm%=9zez the fiscal cliff, the spenting cuts, and tax increases scheduled to take effect in january 2013. speakers include the republican congressman from illinois and alson schwartz, a democrat from pennsylvania. live coverage at 8:30 a.m. eastern here on c-span2.

later, the american enterprise institute hears from the education advisers for the obama and romney campaigns to discuss their candidate's policy plans. we'll be live starting at 4:30 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> this suspect about governor bush. it's not about me. it is about you. i want to come back to something i said before. if you want somebody who believes that we were better off eight years ago than we are now, and that we ought to go back to the kind of policies we had back then, emphasizing tax cuts for the wealthy, here your man. if you want somebody who will fight for you and who will fight to have middle class tax cuts, than i am your man. i want to be. now, i doubt anybody here makes more than $330,000 a year. i won't ask you, but if you do, you're in the top 1%. >> would be a violation of the

rules. >> i'm not going to ask. [laughter] but if everyone here in this audience was dead on in the middle of the middle class, then the tax cuts for every single one of you all added up would be less than the tax cut his plan would give to just one member of that top wealthiest 11%. now, you judge for yourself whether or not that's fair. >> moving on. >> good. 50 million americans get no tax relief under his plan. >> that's not right. >> you may not be one of them, not one of the right people. we had enough fighting. it's time to unite. you talk about eight years, in eight years they have not got anything done on medicare, social security, a party's bill of rights. >> all right. time to get it done. presidential town hall debates began in 1992 with then president george bish, bill clinton, and ross perot, and every election since, hopefuls

take questions from undecided voters in the same style. tuesday night, watch president obama and mitt romney in their town hall debate with live coverage at 7 eastern. retired supreme court justice, john paul stevens, spoke monday about the second amendment and give up laws. the third longest serving justice, author of the 2006 and 2008 dissent on second amendment cases before the court. his remarks at this brady center to prevent gun violence event are an hour. >> a mass shooting at a movie theater just outside denver, colorado, in aurora, a gunman acting alone opening fire. >> that's when i realized this is not, like, part of the movie. there's a gunman shooting everyone. >> first thing they see is a 13 and 14-year-old girl with bullet wounds in her leg and her stomach and her chest. i think she was right there.

>> just two weeks after the shooting in colorado, a gunman opened fire in a temple in wisconsin killing six. >> we got a case in high school, shots fired, gunshots, multiple shots. >> multiple? >> yes. >> do you know where? >> by the gym. >> the unarmed teenager was walking outside the subdivision, and zimmerman called the place about a suspicious person, and zimmerman shot him once in the chest. >> yelling help? >> yes. >> okay, what is -- >> there was gunshots. >> trayvon was our son, but he's your son. a lot of people can relate to our situation, and it breaks their heart just like it breaks mine. >> late wednesday morning, the bearded man seen here entered a popular seattle cafe, the cafe racer, and four minutes later,

four fatally shot, another wounded as the gunman was alone, holding what appears to be a gun. we're going to take you now to chicago where this past weekend at least 52 # people were shot, eight killed. >> the victims include 7-year-old seven sutton shot to death selling candy outside the home. >> the shootings took place in poor neighborhoods, far from downtown and tourist attractions, gunned down in a weekend of violence so typical it didn't even make the front pages. >> on the corner in the bronx, comforting each other trying to make sense of it all. >> killed outside a church. >> two schools -- >> 20th of february, and all right, detroit believes there's been 43 murders in the city. >> a workplace shooting -- >> the gunman killed four people including the owner and then

killed himself. >> although police are not certain, there are reports of firing. ♪ >> good afternoon. my name is dan gross, and it is myñ&r privilege to serve as the president of the brady center to prevent give gun violence. i very briefly want to welcome everybody here and thank our

sponsors and especially thank you, justice stevens, for the extraordinary honor of your participation in this event. [applause] this issue through a personal experience. in february of 1997, my younger brother, matthew gross, was shot in a shooting that happened on the observation deck of the empire state building, and our dear friend also was killed in that tragedy. my brother survived, despite like a lot of our heros in this room. jim brady and considering what happened to him, he's doing remarkably well, but needless to say, it's changed his life and the lives of all of us who love him and care about him forever. in my case, when my brother was shot, i was a partner at a big advertising agency called jay

walter thompson, and i found i couldn't go back to work knowing this was out there and there was an opportunity to do something about it. i quit that job and devoted my life to trying to prevent other families from going through what ours has been through, and that's led me to this extraordinary privilege to assume the presidency of this organization this february. since then, our focus has been not on changing the organization, but right turner getting back to the -- rather getting back to the essence of what made it great in the first place. to put it simply, brady, at its core, has always been the voice of the american people on the gun violence issue, the voice of a public that doesn't want to live in a nation with 32 more give up murders every day. the voice of the overwhelming majority of americans who support sensible measures to make this the safer nation that we all want and we all deserve.

brady's laser focus is to make that voice as bold and powerful as it needs to be to create the change that is too long overdue in our country. our up waiverring mission -- unwaivering mission is to bring together the american public into one voice for a safer nation, a voice that demands real action to confront the tragedy that is gone violence in our country like you saw in that video, one voice, blue state and red, republican and democrat, gun owner or not, mothers, fathers, kids, cops, clergy, and, yes, lawyers, all of us dedicated to the vision of an america with safe neighborhoods, streets, and schools because we, as a nation, we all know we are better than this. we are better than mas shootings in movie theaters and places of worship. we are better than 32 more gun murders in the country every day, a tragedy every day that happens in our country on the

scale of the virginia tech massacre. make no mistake, change is starting to happen. this past summer, will be remembered for the terrible mass shootings like the ones at the movie theater in aurora, colorado and the temple in milwaukee, wisconsin, but i'm confident this summer will also be remembered for something else, for the beginning of a real broad based movement in the nation to finally do something about gun violence once and for all. for the beginning of a sustained solution oriented national conversation, a conversation that brady is helping to convene. it's a conversation that includes americans from across the country and across the political spectrum coming together in a common cause to make this the safer nation that we all want, a conversation that is respectful of those who might like to hunt or target shoot, but don't want 19 people getting gunned down on the streets of

chicago overnight. none of us want that. we've seen people like rupert mer dock and others advocate for safer lives. we were shown that 74% of nra members support criminal background checks for gun sales. hundreds of americans signed petitions and letters like the ones on wearebetterthanthis.org to promote action. it is clear. one voice is forming. a very important part of that voice is the legal community. to use its expertise and resources to protect the good gun laws that are under constant assault by the gun lobby and hold the gun industry accountable when it places profits over people. in fact, i would go so far as to say that no professor right now

has a greater opportunity to prevent gun, deaths, and injuries than the one that is so well represented in this room today. how's that for saddleing you with serious speedometer on your shoulders? i want to emphasize this is not just about you all here today or any one profession. in the end, it's about all of us make our voices heard based or n the belief that we, as a nation, are better than this, and that is brady's pledge to all of you, to the entire american public, that together, we will make the voice of the american people heard, that it will be heard, that it resinates, and that it will be felt, and it will only continue to build until each and every one of us has the freedom to live in the better, safer nation that we all deserve. thank you again for being here and for all of your support.

[applause] now it's also my privilege and pressure to introduce to you one the brady super stars, the directer of brady's legal action project. [applause] >> thank you, dan, and thank you, all, for coming here. i also would like to thank the sponsors of this event, allen bennett, bill harwood, and tom cole, mark hopson, carter phillips, and supporter of ours that is here today, tom green, and please recognize a key member of the board, bob bates. bob, stand up. invaluable member of the legal

team, dan vice. special thanks, of course, to justice stevens for honoring us with his presence. i have the suspicion that most of you are not here to listen to me so i'll proceed quickly, but before i do, i have a few words to say about our work and an exciting new program we are launching. the brady center's legal action project was founded 23 years ago to take the fight for safer america to a level playing field where americans who demand real solutions to gun violence can get a fair hearing. we remain the only public interest law group in america dedicated to figging in the courts -- fighting in the courts to reduce gun deaths and injuries. if you need a reminder of why our work is so vital, recall ten years ago, almost to the day, on the evening of october 14th, 2002, a 47-year-old woman was loading her car outside home depot in falls church, virginia when gunfire came out of nowhere. she was shot dead in front of

her husband. linda franklin was an fbi analyst and mother of two. she was one of 13 random shootings by the dc area snipers that terrorize the region as many recall. one man was shot and killed mowing grass. a woman was reading a book on a bench. a man was pumping gas. a mom was vacuuming cereal off the floor of the van. we all lived in fear that we could be next. we can be. you see, those three weeks in object were fairly typical in terms of gun violence in america. in some parts of this city, people lived every day with fear, the real fear, that gunfire can claim them or their children. the sniper shootings simply brought immediacy to the gun violence that surrounds us every day. in the ten years since, about 1 million people have been shot in

america, about # 00,000 -- about 300,000 lost their lives. imagine the government response if fired by terrorists or an enemy force. they don't wait for politicians to respond. we take direct action to reduce gun violence bringing high impact liability actions to reform gun sales practices that arm criminals. in fact, we won a landmark case on behalf the linda franklin and other victims that foed gun companies to sell guns more responsibly. there was another victory we won in your packets. we have gun violence prevention along by extraordinary work, and we prevented a florida law from advising patients of the risks of guns. most prezzing today, we worked to establish a body of second amendment law to allow americans to protect communities by keeping guns off the streets and

out of the hands of dangerous people. this work has become urgent since the 2008 heller decision in which the supreme court had the audacity to hold over the di sent of justice stevens and three of his colleagues. the second amendment recognizes a right to have hand guns in the home, separate from the well regulated militia reference therefore. heller inspired over 5 # 00 challenges to give up laws with more filed all the time. the cases are part of far reaching campaigns to force guns into every sector of the society and vastly expand the narrow right recognized by the court. they claim, for example, that criminals, domestic violence offenders, drug users, and teens have a right to guns. that military style assault weapons are constitutionally protected, and law enforcement can want take reasonable -- cannot take reasonable actions to keep give ups off the streets.

if these challenges previle, not only will current gun laws be struck down, but americans will be fore closed in much needed action in the future. ifñhr heller is properly read, t will be rejected, and some have, but courts struck down important public safety laws. some cases are heading to appeals courts. as i said, more are filed all the time. that is why the legal action project is launching a new effort, unlike anything we've done in the 23 years. it's called lawyers for a safer america. lawyers and law firms who join will become part of an alliance who will assist and some cases represent governments, victims, gun violence, and other organizations to reduce injuries and deaths. this is a rare opportunity to help develop an emerging body of constitutional law and more rare, to use talents to defeat one of the great threats to american's health and safety. we cannot win this battle

without your help, but with you, we can create new law that recognizes our most basic rights, to life and self-government, and we can save lives. please fill out the cards at your tables to express interest in joining this effort, and hand them to our staff on the way out today. this work is challenging, but fulfilling and crucial to making america a better and safer place. that brings us to the main event, a man who has undoubtedly made america a better, more just, more free, and safer place. there is regrettably only one john paul stevens. he may, in fact, be the only person who's ever shared a stage with two of my other personal heros, thurgood marshall and bob dylan. he was not playing the band, but being awarded the presidential medal of freedom. justice stevens has value i can'tly --

valiantly received the nation earning a bronze star in world war ii. president nixon nominated him to the u.s. court of appeals in the 7th circuit and nominated by president ford, he received over 34 years, the third longest tenure in american history. upon his retirement in 2010, one commentator argued convincely, justice stevens was the greatest associate supreme court justice in american history in lite of the diverse areas of laws in which he left such a profound mark. in addition to the wisdom in the opinions, his writing is a model of clarity, elegance, and wit. justice stevens, by word and deed, inspires us to strive for a more perfect nation and to do so with a civility, decency, and good hue martha reflects the -- humor that reflects the best of our prevention and humanity.

i hope our work here and the work we do together with lawyers for safer america is worthy of justice stevens' example and furthers his ideal and vision of a just american society. it is my honor to introduce a national treasure, the honorable justice john paul stevens. [applause] >> thank you very much. [applause] i thank you for those kind remarks. this morning, i was saddened to read about senator specter's

passing, and i just think i need to say one brief word about him. he was an independent, highly intelligent public servant who received the country with great distinction. i had a number of conversations over the years with the senator, and two that -- one was the argument in the one case that i recall he argued before the supreme court. he was a victim of the very strict enforcement of renquist rule when the red light goes on, and he was never happy with the fact that the chairman of the senate judiciary committee was treated just like any other litigator. [laughter] i also remember the case that he particularly, in my memory of conversations with him, that he particularly was unhappy about was bill renquist's opinion in the violence against women act

which the court held on a statute of unconstitutional, and the opinion that specter thought was not adequately deferential or respectful of congressional findings, and he, on more than one occasion, thought that the court should have shown a little more deference to congress. well, i just wanted to mention the senator before i began with what i've written to present to you. before answering questions that may occur to you, i shall make three briefñmó comments. two roting to the supreme -- relates to the supreme court's 2008 decision in district of columbia against heller, and the third, to the of course, 1997 decision in prince against the united states. as i'm sure you all remember, the central issue in heller concerns the scope of the second amendment's protection of the right to keep and bear arms.

over the years, give ups have been used for military purposes for hunting, for self-defense, for criminal activities, and occasionally to fight duals. in united states against miller, decided in 1939, the court held that congress could prohibit the possession of a sawed off shotgun because that sort of weapon had no reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia. when i joined the court in 1975, that holding was generally understood as limiting the scope of the second amendment to uses the arms that were related to military activity. four years ago, however, in heller, the court concluded that the amendment also protects the right to keep a hand gun in one's home for purposes of self-defense. while the post decision

commentary by his tore yaps and other -- his tore yaps and other scholars reenforced my decision that the court's decision to expand the coverage of the second amendment was incorrect, two good things about the court's opinion merits special comment. first, the court did not overrule miller. instead, it read miller to say only that the second amendment does not protect those weapons, not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as short barreled shotguns. on the preceding page of the its opinion, the court had made a clear that even though machine give ups were useful in warfare in 1939, they were n among the types of weapons protect #ed protected by the second amendment, bus that class of weapons were limited to those of common use for lawful purposes

like self-defense. even though a sawed off shotgun or a machine gun might well be kept at home and useful for self-defense, neither machine guns nor sawed off shotguns satisfied the, quote, "common use," unquote, requirement. thusñhr even as generously construed in heller, the second amendment provides no obstacle to regulations prohibiting the ownership of the use of the sorts of automatic weapons used in the tragic multiple killings in virginia, colorado, and arizona in recent years. the failure of congress to take any action to minimize the risk of similar tragedies in the future cannot be blamed on the court's decision in heller. a second virtue of the opinion in heller is justice scalia went

out of his way to limit the court's holding, not only to a subset of weapons that might be used for self-defense, but also to a subset of conduct that is protect. the specific holding of the case only covers the possession of handguns in the home for purposes of self-defense. part three of the opinion adds emphasis to the narrowness of that holding by describing uses that were not protected by the common law or state practice. prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill and laws for bidding of carrying firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings or imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms are specifically